Global ATM banking: casting the net by John D. Hueter & Ben R. Craig
T wenty-five years of technological
progress have transformed the way
banking is done. Paychecks can be
deposited, charitable contributions with-
drawn, electronically. Customers can
make cash withdrawals without ever
seeing a human teller, at a machine their
bank doesn’t own, perhaps even in a
country where their bank has no office.
These innovations have not only affected
customer convenience, but have also
changed the economic reference points
for evaluating the efficiency of the elec-
tronic payments industry.
This Economic Commentary describes
how a payment is automatically trans-
ferred through electronic signals, then
discusses the automated teller machine
(ATM) networks that cover the globe.
Finally, it addresses the policy question
of how to achieve a socially optimal sys-
tem, emphasizing market structure, tech-
nology, and compatibility. 
n n   The Automated 
Clearing House
The Automated Clearing House (ACH)
system makes payroll transfers electroni-
cally, using a network to move funds
from the employer’s account to the
employee’s (see figure 1).1  In the case of
a payroll transfer, the firm is the origina-
tor, arranging with its bank to transfer
funds to its employee’s account. The
firm’s bank assembles all the firm’s
transfers regardless of transaction type
(payments for utilities or other services)
and sends an electronic message contain-
ing a list of transfers to the ACH opera-
tor. The operator electronically sorts the
transfers to their various banking destina-
tions (not all payroll transfers go to the
same bank) and calculates the total of
credits (or dollar amounts) that need to
be transferred. He or she sends an elec-
tronic message containing a list of the
transfers to the various receiving banks,
including the employee’s bank or finan-
cial institution, which then credits the
employee’s account. The ACH operator
is the key element in the process that
clears and settles transactions between
banks, eliminating the need for bilateral
relationships between financial institu-
tions. Like a billing agent, the operator
informs the various banks that their
accounts have credits or debits. In the
case of the payroll transfer, the operator
sends the firm’s bank an electronic notice
to debit the amount of the payroll and
also the employee’s bank of a credit. The
transaction is usually settled with finality
on the next day, when accounts are offi-
cially balanced with the proper funds.
In response to rapid increases in check
volume in the 1960s and concerns about
the cost of supporting future growth effi-
ciently, the ACH payment mechanism
was established in 1972 as an electronic
alternative to the traditional paper-based
check collection system.2  One distinct
advantage of ACH transactions over reg-
ular checks is cost. On the consumer
end, there is no charge for paying your
gas bill by the ACH system; with a
check, there is the cost of the stamp, the
check, and your time. From the corpo-
rate perspective, the cost of handling a
check mailed by a consumer to the com-
pany’s bank lock box is 14 cents (com-
pared to 5 cents for an ACH payment).3
n n   The ATM System
Once the payroll is deposited, an ATM
system permits an employee to access
the money at any time and from practi-
cally any place in the country (figure 2).4
When a cardholder tries to withdraw
money from an ATM machine, it sends a
signal to a switch linked to the various
financial institutions that issue ATM
cards.5  This switch connects the ATM
machine electronically with the card-
holder’s bank, which automatically
updates the cardholder’s account and
transmits its approval back through the
switch to the ATM machine. Only then
does the cardholder receive cash.
There are three types of ATM systems:
proprietary, shared/regional, and
national/international. A proprietary
system, operated by a financial institu-
tion that purchases or leases ATMs,
acquires the necessary software or
develops it in-house, installs the system
and markets it, and issues cards of its
own design (proprietary systems are
less prevalent today).6
A shared/regional ATM system is a net-
work that comes into being when cus-
tomers of one or more financial institu-
tions have access to transaction services
at ATMs owned or operated by other
financial institutions. A common type of
sharing is the joint venture with other
financial institutions, featuring common
access and cooperative control.
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Both the ACH and ATM systems are
examples of networks, where the ben-
efits of one participant enhances the
value of the structure for the other
participants. Networks are difficult to
analyze, but some recent results from
economic theory suggest that compet-
itive networks are preferable in a
social sense to monopoly networks.
ISSN 0428-1276A national/international system is also a
network, one that enables an ATM
machine in New York to connect with
another in Los Angeles. Through service
agreements with regional and propri-
etary networks, national networks link
ATM machines coast to coast.
n n    Networks
Although ACH and ATM systems are
both networks, they are of two quite dif-
ferent sorts.7  The ACH network con-
nects two retail customers. For example,
the government uses a bank’s ACH ser-
vices to send out Social Security checks,
whose recipients, in turn, use ACH pay-
ments to cover electric bills or insurance
payments. The ATM network connects
two banks, giving customers access to a
range of teller services.
Networks can be thought of as mecha-
nisms through which economic agents
(business firms, households, financial
institutions) can interact with one
another. An inherent feature of a net-
work’s structure is that it requires many
components to provide a typical service.8
More formally, networks are composed
of links that connect nodes. Returning to
figure 1, the nodes are the originator, the
sending bank, the ACH operator, the
receiving bank, and the final receiver, all
linked electronically. Some other com-
monly used networks are long-distance
phone services and the Internet.
A network’s main characteristic is that
its components are complementary: one
needs the other in order to provide a
service. Thus, a network is made up of
complementary components that
together produce a service or good. In
the ACH example, the linkages from the
employer’s bank to the ACH operator
and the ACH operator to the employee’s
bank are complementary. A single trans-
action is a good made up of two comple-
mentary links, the first between the
employer’s bank and ACH operator, the
second between the ACH operator and
the employee’s bank. This complemen-
tarity leads to another feature: network
goods and services exhibit network
externalities. The benefit one person or
institution gets from using a network
depends on how many others are using
it. For example, the value to a consumer
from purchasing a VCR may depend on
the number of rental movie titles avail-
able. The number of movie companies
willing to publish titles in the same for-
mat in turn depends on the total number
of people who own VCRs. 
Network externalities are very different
from some other common externalities
such as pollution, where economic activ-
ity by some individuals produces pollu-
tants that affect a broad population. Indi-
viduals make choices about participating
in an activity that generates pollution,
but have little choice about being
affected by it. Network externalities are
more self-contained. An individual’s
decision to subscribe to a network cre-
ates external benefits for other sub-
scribers by increasing the size of the net-
work. To enjoy the externality effects,
however, one must join the network. 
The benefits of the ATM network today
are much greater than at its inception
because it has grown so large. Access to
ATMs and the convenience they offer
cardholders are much greater now that
there are more machines connected to
more banks. Similarly, banks can substi-
tute cheaper ATM transactions for more
expensive human teller transactions be-
cause their customers are willing to use
the machines, which are more convenient
because more banks are placing ma-
chines on the network. The ACH system
is a payments network. Users must be
members of the network; the more mem-
bers, the more valuable a membership.
FIGURE 1 ACH TRANSACTION FLOWS
FIGURE 2  ATM TRANSACTION FLOWS
a. Originating depository financial institution.
b. Receiving depository financial institution.
NOTE: direction of transaction flow;  direction of funds flow.
SOURCE: Furash & Company.
SOURCE: Authors’ adaptation of a chart from Star System, Inc.n n    Market Structure,
Compatibility & Technology
Market structure, compatibility, and
technology are three areas that challenge
regulatory authorities to find ways to
make a network socially optimal. 
Market Structure
Competition alone does not ensure a
socially optimal outcome for a
network.9 For one thing, joining up cre-
ates more benefits for existing members
of the network than for the new member
who pays the cost. Thus, the number of
new members will be smaller than it
would be had an all-knowing social
planner mandated participation. Of
course such an omniscient, disinterested
planner exists only in our imaginations,
so our concern should be whether the
inefficiencies of the competitive price
framework are large enough to justify
using another structure.
For example, one might suggest a
monopoly as a possible structure for
achieving optimality, but recent studies
strongly indicate that even though the
monopolist has an interest in expanding
the network to increase demand, this
desire is overwhelmed by his natural ten-
dency to raise prices by restricting out-
put. Indeed, a monopolist-controlled net-
work will be smaller than a competitive
one. Therefore, the existence of network
externalities does not reverse the stan-
dard welfare preference for a competitive
market rather than a monopoly.10
We can say that a monopoly network is
less efficient than a set of competitive
ones, which in turn is smaller than opti-
mal size, but much about networks re-
mains undiscovered. How should we
analyze the optimality of the current
ATM system, with three national net-
works and five regional networks ac-
counting for the majority of the transac-
tions? How can the Federal Reserve
price its 80 percent share in the ACH
market efficiently? Network theory pro-
vides a framework for posing these
questions precisely.
Technology and Compatibility
Network technology also raises difficult
issues. There is no theoretical reason
why one ATM network must be compat-
ible with another. Indeed, rapid technical
advances may provide strong incentives
for new networks to use superior innova-
tive protocols, file structures, encryption
techniques, and so on, although they are
incompatible with those of existing net-
works. These technical issues are further
complicated by the difficulty of analyz-
ing market structure. 
To illustrate the sorts of problems a reg-
ulator faces, suppose an ATM network
proposes developing a superior encryp-
tion technology that increases the secu-
rity of transactions but is incompatible
with other networks.
Developing new technologies is risky
and expensive. Should the firm make the
technology available to other networks,
thus ensuring that the connected “mega-
network” (composed of the connected
networks) is larger and giving its own
members the positive network externali-
ties? Or should the firm maintain exclu-
sivity, thus conferring advantages of
membership that are not available in
other networks? Recent theoretical work
has developed suggestive examples
showing that, in some cases, meganet-
work incentives are strong enough to
encourage one network to share its tech-
nical secrets. In other examples, the
monopoly incentives dominate and the
network fights to retain exclusive control
over its technology.11
n n    Challenges
Policymakers face additional problems,
especially when dynamic issues of mar-
ket structure are considered. Some theo-
retical examples from the computer
industry show that monopoly networks
can be dynamically beneficial. If there
are incentives for the innovating net-
work to create new products (because
they can extract rents later), allowing
monopoly profits (even if that means
short-term social inefficiency) can be
beneficial over a longer horizon. Of
course, as in all the approaches dis-
cussed here, the conclusions depend on
the analyst’s framework. Our empirical
knowledge of the size of potential
monopoly profits for ATM and ACH
systems is so slight as to make judg-
ments about the relevance of these
assumptions very difficult.
Market structures are not static. Their
dynamic properties depend on the com-
patibility of the technologies with other
networks. For example, imagine a mar-
ket with a large number of competitive,
identical networks whose technologies
are mutually incompatible. While this
situation is possible, it is dynamically
unstable. If even one additional individ-
ual joins one of these networks, that net-
work becomes more useful to its mem-
bers because it is larger. This induces
more members to switch to the bigger
network, and the cycle continues, until
the market consists of only one monop-
oly network. This simple example illus-
trates the difficulty of evaluating a pol-
icy solely from the perspective of
current market structure. A given anti-
trust policy for the ACH network could
produce undetermined effects if the mar-
ket structure changes. Suppose, for
example, that, socially speaking, the best
solution calls for a high price in Fed
ACH services in a hypothetical static
scenario. The social effects could be dis-
astrous if it were to encourage monopoly
transformation of the electronic pay-
ments industry.
Thus, ATM and payments networks are
nonstandard industries because of their
strong network externalities. Initial
research on the ACH system suggests
that it involves large-scale network
externalities.12  While it is clear that we
need more theory about how networks
operate, along with research that distin-
guishes the most relevant models, the
current state of network theory provides
basic intuition about appropriate policy
as well as a precise framework in which
to formulate the policy discussion.
n n    Footnotes
1.  The ACH is an electronic batch process-
ing system by which payment orders are
exchanged among financial institutions. It is
designed for high-volume, mostly small-
dollar recurring transactions, such as payroll,
mortgage, car loan, or Social Security pay-
ments. For complete definitions and a dia-
gram of the ACH process, see U.S. General
Accounting Office, Payments, Clearance,
and Settlement: A Guide to the Systems,
Risks, and Issues, Report to the Chairman of
the Committee on Banking and Financial
Services, U.S. House of Representatives
(GAO/GGD 97–73), June 1997.
2.  There are four major ACH networks; the
Federal Reserve System, the New York Clear-
ing House Association, Visa, and the Ameri-
can Automated Clearing House Association.
The Federal Reserve System is the largest,
with over 80 percent of ACH volume.
3.  American Electric Power presentation at
the Payments 98 Conference, sponsored by
the National ACH Association. Seattle,
Washington, March 1998.
4.  There were over 165,000 ATM terminals
and over 10 billion ATM transactions in
1997.  The three largest national ATM net-
works are Discover Card, Cirrus, and
Visa/Plus, each with an average of more than
130,000 machines accessible through a single
card. The leading regional networks are Star,Honor, NYCE, MAC, and Pulse, averaging
over 20,000 machines each. See Faulkner
and Grey, Bank Network News, vol. 16, no. 9
(September 26, 1997).
5.  A switch is the mechanism that directs the
ATM transaction to the cardholder’s financial
institution.
6. For descriptions of ATM networks, see
Allen H. Lipis, Thomas R. Marschall, and Jan
H. Linker, Electronic Banking. New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1985.
7.  “ATM  networks” refers to the shared/
regional and the national/international ATM
systems.
8.  For good literature surveys on the
economies of networks, see Nicholas Econo-
mides, “The Economics of Networks,” Inter-
national Journal of Industrial Organization,
vol. 14,  no. 6 (October 1996), pp. 673–99;
and John A. Weinberg, “Network Externali-
ties and Public Goods in Payment Systems,”
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Eco-
nomic Quarterly, vol. 83, no. 2 (Spring 1997),
pp. 25–44.
9.  We use “socially optimal” in the standard
sense: No other outcome will make some
participants better off without making any
worse off.
10.  See Nicholas Economides and C. Him-
melberg, “Critical Mass and Network Size
with Application to the US Fax Market,” in
Gerald W Brock, ed., Toward a Competitive
Telecommunication Industry: Selected
Papers from the 1994 Telecommunications
Policy Research Conference. Mahwah, 
N.J.: Lawrence Eribaum Associates, 1995,
pp. 47–63.
11. See Nicholas Economides, “A Monopo-
list’s Incentive to Invite Competitors to
Enter in Telecommunications Services,” in
Gerard Pogorel, ed., Global Telecommunica-
tions Strategies and Technological Changes.
Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1994, pp. 227–39;
and Nicholas Economides, “Network Exter-
nalities, Complementarities, and Invitations
to Enter,” European Journal of Political
Economy, vol. 12,  no. 2 (September 1996),
pp. 211–33.
12.  See Gautam Gowrisankaran and Joanna
Stavins, “Are There Network Externalities in
Electronic Payments?” Federal Reserve Bank
of Boston, working paper (forthcoming).
John D. Hueter is a research assistant at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, and Ben
R. Craig is an economic advisor there.
The views stated herein are those of the
authors and not necessarily those of the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Cleveland or the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Economic Commentary is available elec-
tronically through the Cleveland Fed’s site on
the World Wide Web: http://www.clev.frb.org.
We also offer a free online subscription serv-
ice to notify readers of additions to our Web











Please send corrected mailing label to
the above address.
Material may be reprinted provided that
the source is credited. Please send copies 
of reprinted materials to the editor.